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DRAWING EFFECTIVE MINORITY DISTRICTS:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY, AND DAVID LUBLIN*
When applying the Voting Rights Act, courts and commentators alike
have too often fixated on the distinction between "majority-minority"
districts and "majority-white" districts, while paying relatively little
attention to the likely electoral outcomes that any given districting plan
will actually generate. In this Article, three political scientists provide a
conceptual framework for predicting minority electoral success, taking
into account the participation rates and voting patterns of minority and
white voters, as well as incorporating the multi-stage election process
(primaries plus general elections, and sometimes runoff elections). The
Authors also analyze empirical election data to demonstrate how the
model can be applied to address voting rights disputes.
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INTRODUCrION
Labels can be misleading. In the last decade, federal and state
judges applying the Voting Rights Act' have analyzed election
districts by using labels such as "majority-black," "majority-
Hispanic," and "majority-minority" in nearly three hundred cases
Those labels never appear in the Act itself, and some jurists and
commentators have argued that they rest on a misreading of
congressional intent. Perhaps the greatest problem with these labels
is that they confuse more than they illuminate because their
definitions are inconsistent from case to case. Absent swift guidance
from the Supreme Court, this confusion could generate an enormous
amount of needless litigation in the coming months, as states attempt
to redraw district lines in response to the newly released data from
the 2000 census.
Some courts and commentators have used labels such as
"majority-black" quite literally, to refer to a simple arithmetic
concept: If African Americans outnumber everyone else in a given
district, or if African-American adults outnumber other adults, or if
African-American adult citizens outnumber other adult citizens, then
a district is "majority-black." At other times, the labels have been
used in a functional sense, to refer to districts that are effectively
controlled (or have at least a fifty-fifty chance of being effectively
controlled) by African Americans or, to put it differently, where
African-American voters have a realistic chance of electing their
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
2. This figure is derived from a search of Westlaw's ALLCASES database, covering
reported decisions from January 1, 1991 to November 1, 2000. A similar search, covering
the same period, reveals more than six hundred law review articles using this terminology.
3. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
But see id. at 956-57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 957-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1384 [Vol. 79
EFFECTIVE MINORITY DISTRICTS
preferred candidates. Each of these definitions overlaps to some
significant degree, but many of the most difficult cases in voting rights
jurisprudence arise precisely where it may be possible to draw a
district that is "majority-black" under one definition, but not under
another.
This Article will make a two-fold argument. First, the Voting
Rights Act, properly interpreted, should focus on actual election
outcomes, not on rigid demographic "cutoff lines" such as 50% black
population. Second, a proper analysis of likely election outcomes
depends on several factors: the relative rate at which minorities and
whites participate in the electoral process, the degree to which
minority and white voters support minority-preferred candidates, and
the fact that, in the United States, we have a two-stage electoral
process. The last point, in particular, has been neglected by political
scientists, election law experts and the courts. Many public offices,
however, including most congressional and state legislative seats,
require a candidate first to win her party's nomination in the primary
and then to prevail against the other parties' nominees in the general
election. In fact, in some instances (as in many southern states), there
is even an intermediate stage, a runoff election.4 This Article offers a
conceptual framework that takes into account all stages of the
election process in predicting minority electoral success or failure.
The Article concludes by emphasizing the need for case-specific
analyses to determine the percentage minority necessary to provide
minority voters with an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of
choice.
Part I of this Article describes how the Voting Rights Act may be
interpreted functionally, to focus on the effectiveness of minority
districts in actually electing minority candidates, rather than fixating
on arbitrary demographic cutoffs. Part II reviews the political science
literature on the link between a district's minority population
percentage and its effectiveness in electing minority-preferred
candidates. Finally, part III examines empirical data from
congressional elections in the South, and from state legislative
elections in South Carolina, to show how the framework can be
4. Runoff elections are generally held when no candidate receives a majority of the
vote in a primary election. The top two primary candidates are required to compete in
another round of balloting, and in this second (or "runoff") election, the candidate that
receives the majority of the vote wins the election-and usually proceeds to a general
election. The runoff is currently used in twelve states-ten of which are in the South. See
generally, CHARLES BULLOCK III & LOCH K. JOHNSON, RUNOFF ELECrIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992) (providing data on runoffs and their racial implications).
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applied, and to demonstrate the need for case-specific analyses in
determining the percent minority population needed to give minority
candidates an equal opportunity to be elected to legislative office.
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND EFFECTIVE MINORITY DISTRICTS
Two sections of the Voting Rights Act deal most directly with
redistricting. Section 2 of the Act applies nationwide,5 while section 5
applies only to certain "covered jurisdictions. ' 6 Although the
procedural requirements of each section are entirely different, this
Article focuses on the substantive standards.
As originally enacted by Congress in 1965, both section 2 and
section 5 echoed the words of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution7 and prohibited the "den[ial] or abridg[ement of] the
right to vote on account of race or color."8 Over time, federal courts
held that the Act applied to redistricting,9 and Congress expanded it
to protect members of language-minority groups as well as racial
groups.10
In 1982, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act"
and added language explaining that one's right to vote is illegally
5. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.4 App. (2000).
6. Id. Section 5 applies to nine States in their entirety (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia) and to parts of seven
others (California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and
South Dakota). These jurisdictions are covered by section 5 by virtue of the formula
contained in section 4(b) of the Act: (1) the jurisdiction maintained a test or device as a
precondition for registering or voting as of November 1, 1964 and (2) less than 50 percent
of the voting age population was registered to vote on November 1, 1968 or November 1,
1972, or less than 50 percent of the voting age population voted in the November 1968 or
the November 1972 election. Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting
Rights Act on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures
and Congressional Delegations, in QUITE REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACr OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr 1965-1990, at 335, 342-43 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman, eds. 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH].
7. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST., amend. XV,
§ 1.
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5,79 Stat. 437,439 (1965); id. § 2,
79 Stat. 437,437 (1965).
9. E.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526,531-35 (1973).
10. 89 Stat. 400,401 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1994)).
11. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended to make it clear that plaintiffs
alleging unlawful vote dilution need not prove purposeful discrimination, but rather that
the voting standard, practice or procedure "results in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on the account of race or color." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1994).
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abridged "if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that... [members of a protected class of minority-group citizens]
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."' 2 As the Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendments
explained, Congress sought to eradicate voting practices that
"minimize or cancel out the voting strength and political effectiveness
of minority groups.""
As for section 5, the Supreme Court announced a
"nonretrogression" standard: A new voting practice (such as a
redistricting plan) must not have the purpose or the effect of
"worsening" the position, or lessening the voting strength, of minority
voters.'4 Thus, a new redistricting plan under the Voting Rights
Act-under either section 2 or section 5-must estimate the future
voting strength of minority citizens under the new plan. Under
section 5, that level of future voting strength is then compared with
the level of minority voting strength under the previous plan, to see
whether the new plan is "retrogressive."'" Under section 2, the level
of future voting strength under the challenged plan is compared with
some hypothetical "illustrative plan" presented by the plaintiffs, to
see whether the new plan is "dilutive." In either inquiry, the key is
estimating future minority voting strength.
As the plain text of section 2 makes clear, the central focus of a
minority voting rights challenge to a redistricting plan is its effect on
minority voters' opportunities "to elect representatives of their
choice."' 6 Thus, under section 2, the central question when analyzing
a new plan or a hypothetical alternative proposed by the plaintiffs is,
how many representatives preferred by minority voters are likely to
be elected under each competing plan, and with what degree of
certainty. Defining which candidates should qualify as "minority-
preferred" is a question the courts are still grappling with, but for the
purposes of this Article, we have assumed that minority voters cannot
be said to have a truly equal opportunity to elect if only their favorite
white candidates can be elected to office.' Hence, we will refer
12. Id
13. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,205.
14. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,141 (1976).
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
17. Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998) ("It may be highly
regrettable that a candidate's race should matter to the electorate; but it does; and the
cases interpreting the Voting Rights Act do not allow the courts to ignore that
preference."); Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe Act's
13872001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
interchangeably to "minority candidates" and "minority-preferred
candidates."
The essential task under section 5 is very similar to that under
section 2: to quantify minority voters' opportunity to elect their
preferred candidates under either of two competing plans. The main
difference is that the new plan is compared not to the plaintiffs'
hypothetical map, but rather to the status quo plan in effect at the last
election. For simplicity's sake, we will focus then on section 2 for the
remainder of this Article. We will also focus, for conceptual clarity,
on biracial jurisdictions, where the vast majority of the population is
either black or white, with few Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, or
multiracial individuals.
The two leading cases interpreting section 2-the Supreme
Court's 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,18 and its 1994 decision
in Johnson v. DeGrandy'9-contained language that has proven
confusing to the lower courts. On the one hand, the decisions seemed
to place dispositive weight on the number of districts that were
literally "majority-minority," apparently on the assumption that only
districts where blacks (or Hispanics) outnumber whites provided
minority voters with the potential to elect their preferred candidates.20
On the other hand, while the evidence in Gingles clearly showed
racial polarization, i.e., most blacks preferred black candidates while
most whites preferred their opponents, the evidence also suggested
that blacks did not necessarily have to be a majority in a given district
in order to elect their preferred candidates. In her concurrence,
Justice O'Connor expanded on this theme, noting that a minority
group that could count on some white support did indeed have the
potential to elect its preferred candidates, even if the district fell
guarantee of equal opportunity is not met when ... candidates favored by minorities can
win, but only if the candidates are white.") (citations, internal quotation marks, and
brackets omitted).
18. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
19. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
20. The Gingles Court established a three-prong test, with the second and third
prongs relating to the extent of racially polarized voting. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-52. The
first prong required section 2 plaintiffs "to demonstrate that [their minority group] is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district." ML at 50 (emphasis added). The Court explained that if "the minority group is
so small in relation to the surrounding white population that it could not constitute a
majority in a single-member district, these minority voters cannot maintain that they
would have been able to elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the
[challenged plan]." Id at 50 n.17; see also DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1016 n.12 (implying that
51% non-Hispanic districts would leave Hispanic voters with no power to affect election
results).
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somewhat shy of being literally "majority-minority." 21
Furthermore, the Gingles Court's repeated admonition to federal
judges to perform a "functional" analysis of minority vote dilution, 2
and to use their "familiarity with the indigenous political reality" to
conduct "an intensely local appraisal" of the likely impact of the
challenged plan, suggested a rejection of simple formulae or rules of
thumb.23
Eight years later, Justice Souter, writing for the seven-Justice
majority in DeGrandy, reiterated the Gingles Court's admonition to
perform a functional analysis and went out of his way to use the
terminology of "effective" or "functional" voting majorities, rather
than relying entirely upon strict demographic tallies? 4
Although some courts have been attracted to the simplicity and
clarity of a strict mathematical cutoff line,2 others have opted to focus
on whether a minority group has an "effective" voting majority,
meaning that the minority group members are actually capable of
electing their preferred candidates over the opposition of most,
though not necessarily all, of the white voters in the district.26 The
U.S. Department of Justice, which Congress has charged with the
responsibility of enforcing the Voting Rights Act, recently has taken
the latter position, arguing strongly against the "flat 50% rule."'27
Under the Justice Department's view, Voting Rights Act plaintiffs
21' Gingles, 478 U.S. at 90 n.12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45,62,66-67,73,78-79.
23. Id. at 78-79.
24. See, e.g., DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1000 ("effective voting majorities"); id. at 1004
("a functional majority of Hispanic voters"); id. at 1014, 1021, 1023 n.19 ("an effective
voting majority"); id. at 1017 ("districts in which minority voters form an effective
majority"); id. at 1024 ("an effective majority").
25. The supposed advantages of a bright-line 50% rule, however, may prove
chimerical. Creating a strict cutoff line generates several thorny issues: What is the
relevant population base-total population, adult (or voting age) population (known as
VAP), adult citizen population (known as CVAP), the population of registered voters, the
population of voters who actually turn out on election day, the population of voters who
turn out and do not "roll off" before getting far enough down the ballot to select a
candidate for the office in question? If the answer is not total population or VAP, how
does one estimate these figures, because they are not part of the Census Bureau's P.L. 94-
171 redistricting database and therefore are not available when states have to draw new
district lines? Even if total population or VAP is the relevant base, how does one count
people who check off more than one racial category-for example, individuals who are
both African-American and white?
26. If a majority of white voters prefers the same candidate that most minority voters
prefer, then voting is not racially polarized and the Voting Rights Act would not apply.
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
27. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 11, Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep.
Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000) (No. 98-1987).
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can make out a claim of vote dilution by showing that the minority
voters have the potential to elect a representative of their choice with
the assistance of limited crossover voting from the white majority (or
from other racial or language minorities)-regardless of whether
members of the plaintiffs' minority group constitute an arithmetic
majority in the proposed district.
If the Justice Department's interpretation prevails in the courts,
the ability to differentiate an "effective" minority district from an
"ineffective" one will become central to every redistricting dispute
under the Voting Rights Act. That the Supreme Court will not
resolve this question before states have to redraw their congressional
and state legislative district lines now appears nearly certain.29 Given
the position taken by the Justice Department (as well as by a
substantial number of courts), all participants in redistricting litigation
will have to be prepared to debate the "effectiveness" of various
proposed minority districts, with minority populations both above and
below the 50% threshold. The remainder of this Article will address
how best to do that.
II. THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEBATE ON EFFECrIVE MINORITY
DISTRICTS
Questions regarding the minority population percentage needed
to provide minority voters with an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of choice are not new-social scientists and the courts
have been grappling with this issue for decades. In the South during
the 1970s and 1980s, data presented by social science experts in trials
challenging at-large electoral systems provided compelling evidence
of racially polarized voting in numerous jurisdictions. 30  Further,
28" Id. at 6-14.
29. The most recent Supreme Court redistricting case, Hunt v. Cromartie, 120 S. Ct.
2715 (2000), involving a challenge to the congressional plan that the North Carolina
General Assembly in 1997, did not directly address the issues pursued in this article. It
should be noted, however, that even if one believes that the 50% cutoff line is irrelevant
under the Voting Rights Act, the fact that a district was drawn with the motive of pushing
the black (or Hispanic) percentage above some artificial threshold such as 50% could
significantly increase its chance of being struck down as an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander under the Shaw doctrine. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 969-72 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (invalidating Texas's Thirtieth Congressional District in part because
the state legislature specifically sought to push its black percentage above 50% and ended
up drawing a dramatically irregular district with a black population percentage between
50.0% and 50.1%). In Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 193-94 (3rd Cir. 2001), the court finds
that districts with less than a black majority may, sometimes, nonetheless, provide black
voters a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of choice.
30. See Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election
Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States, in QUIET R.EVOLUTION IN THE
[Vol. 791390
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because a higher proportion of blacks than whites were not of voting
age, and because black levels of political participation were less than
those of whites, instituting a remedy meant creating a single-member
district with a black electoral majority with more than a bare 50%+
black population percentage. These conditions led some civil-rights
advocates to argue that, in the South, districts with 65% black
population were needed before African-American candidates could
win.3
1
This claim was challenged by various scholars, including two of
the co-authors of this Article (Grofman and Handley), who suggested
that a district-specific and election-specific sensitivity to black voting
age population, registration, and turnout percentages relative to that
of whites was appropriate. These scholars also claimed that, by and
large, over the course of the 1980s, districts with a 50% or more black
population base (both in the South and elsewhere) displayed a high
probability of electing black candidates to office, 32 subject to two
provisos. First, black population percentages of even less than 50%
might be adequate to elect black Democratic candidates if there was
also a substantial Hispanic component to the district. Second, due
primarily to lower citizen voting age eligibility rates among Hispanics,
Hispanic population percentages well above 50% may be needed to
provide Hispanic voters with an equal opportunity to elect candidates
of choice.33
SOUTH, supra note 6, at 301-11.
31. See, e.g., FRANK PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT
IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, at 199-205 (1990).
32. In the last election prior to the 1990 round of redistricting, every majority black
congressional district in the South (there were four such districts) elected an African
American to office; conversely, only one non-majority black district in the South (out of a
total of 112 non-majority black districts) elected an African American to office. See
Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Voting Rights in the 1990s: An Overview, in RACE
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s, at 69, 74-75 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998)
[hereinafter RACE AND REDISTRICrING]; Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred
Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship between Minority Percentages in
Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND
REDISTRICTING, supra, at 13, 14-23; see also David Lublin, The Election of African
Americans and Latinos to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-1994, 25 AM. POL. Q.
269, 270 (1997) (arguing that race continues to play a role in congressional elections).
33. See Kimball Brace et al., Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory
and Practice, 10 LAW & POL'Y 43, 47-48 (1988); Grofman & Davidson, supra note 30, at
301, 319-321; Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Black Representation: Making Sense of
Electoral Geography at Different Levels of Government, 14 LEG. STUD. Q., 265, 265-66
(1989); Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black
Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEG. STUD. Q. 111, 112 (1991); Bernard
Grofinan & Lisa Handley, Minority Population Proportion and Black and Hispanic
Congressional Success in the 1970s and 1980s, 17 AM. POL. Q. 436, 443-44 (1989); Bernard
2001] 1391
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The issue of the minority population percentage needed to
provide minority voters with an equal opportunity to elect candidates
of choice was revisited using 1990s redistricting data by these and
other authors 4 A number of authors posited that an increase in the
willingness of whites to support black candidates in the 1990s made it
possible for black candidates to win even in districts with black
percentages well below 50%, at least if black candidates did not
confine themselves to narrowly tailored appeals to members of their
own race, but pursued instead a "deracialized" strategy. While
Swain's conclusions were challenged as being fatally flawed on
methodological grounds,36 other scholars-most notably Charles
Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, suggested that even
black population percentages as low as 41% were likely to result in
victorious black candidacies-continued to offer similar conclusions.3 7
Like Swain, however, Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran failed
to take into account the composition of the non-black electorate of
these districts. As Lublin argued, if a district has a combined black-
plus-Hispanic majority, as long as there are more black voters than
either Hispanic or non-Hispanic white voters in the Democratic
primary, the high Democratic loyalties of (non-Cuban) Hispanics will
enable the (almost certainly) black winner of the Democratic primary
Grofman & Lisa Handley, Preconditions for Black and Hispanic Congressional Success, in
UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES
31, 38-39 (Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman eds., 1992); Handley & Grofnan, supra
note 6, at 343-44.
34. See DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 39-48 (1997); CAROL M.
SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK
AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 209 (1993); Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The
Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209,
1213-1253 (1999); Charles S. Bullock, III, Winners and Losers in the Latest Round of
Redistricting, 44 EMORY L.J. 943, 950-960 (1995); Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-
Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 794, 794-805 (1996); Handley et al., supra note 32, at 13; David Epstein &
Sharyn O'Halloran, A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting, and Representation,
93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 187-191 (1999); Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in
Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 205, 249-253 (1995); David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and
African-American Representation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?," 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 183-84
(1999) [hereinafter Lublin, Racial Redistricting]; Lublin, supra note 32, at 269-79.
35. See SWAIN, supra note 34, at 209.
36. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Minority Representation in
Congress, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 8, 1996, at B10; Grofman & Handley, supra note
34, at 246-53; Randall Kennedy, Blacks in Congress: Carol Swain's Critique, in 2
RECONSTRUCTION 34 (1993).
37. See Cameron et al., supra note 34, at 804-05; Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note
34, at 188.
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to go on to win the general election.3 8  Failing to take Hispanic
percentages into account will lead to regression estimates that
understate the proportion of black population needed to provide
black voters with an opportunity to elect black-preferred candidates
in districts where the non-black voters are largely or entirely non-
Hispanic.39
The debates between Swain and Grofman/Handley and between
Epstein/O'Haloran and Lublin still leave many issues unresolved. In
particular, none of the works by the above authors offer a clear model
of how to integrate the results of both primary and general elections
into an assessment of the chances of success for black (or Hispanic)
candidates.4" To understand U.S. elections, however, it is critical to
view them as a two-stage process, in which a candidate must win both
the primary election and the general election. Moreover, some
factors which might militate against minority candidate success in a
general election-such as an increase in the proportion of whites who
identify (and vote) as Republicans-may actually make it more likely
that a minority candidate wins the Democratic primary.
We propose a conceptual framework for determining the
percentage minority needed to create an effective minority district
that incorporates not only the rate at which minorities and whites
participate in the electoral process and the degree to which minority
and white voters support minority-preferred candidates, but the likely
impact of the primary (and runoff) election on the ultimate electoral
outcome. We do this in the context of examining congressional
elections in majority black districts in the South and, for illustrative
38. See Lublin, Racial Redistricting, supra note 34, at 183-84.
39. See id.; Lublin, supra note 32, at 276-79.
40. While it has long been argued that we cannot understand black electoral success in
partisan elections without looking at both primaries and general elections, see, e.g.,
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 58-61, 80-82 (1986) (summarizing Grofman's expert
testimony), most authors who consider primary elections tend to do so separately from
their analysis of general elections. Two notable exceptions are DAVID T. CANON, RACE,
REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
BLACK MAJORrrY DISTRICTS (1999) and J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence
Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 578
(1993). Professor Kousser wrote:
In partisan contests, the proportion of the dominant minority group necessary
to have a high probability of effectively controlling the district might well be
lower than in nonpartisan elections, because a percentage well below 50% of the
voters could comprise a majority of the dominant political party. In such an
instance, the crucial question would be the likely extent of white or other group
defection from minority-endorsed party nominees in the general election.
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purposes, state legislative districts in one southern state-South
Carolina.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF MINORITY DIsTRICrs IN THE SOUTH IN THE
1990s
A. Black Congressional Districts in the South
A dramatic increase in the number of majority-minority districts
during the 1990s round of redistricting led to more minority
candidates being elected to legislative office in 1992 than ever before.
Most striking, perhaps, was the threefold increase in the number of
African-American congressional representatives in the South. Prior
to the 1990s round of redistricting, five African Americans were
elected to Congress from the South; by 1992, seventeen African
Americans represented the South in Congress. Four of the five black
congressmen serving in Congress prior to the 1990s redistricting
represented majority black districts: John Lewis from the Georgia
5th (Atlanta), William Jefferson from the Louisiana 2nd (New
Orleans), Mike Espy from the Mississippi 2nd (Mississippi Delta
region) and Harold Ford from the Tennessee 9th (Memphis). A fifth
black representative, Craig Washington, was elected from a 39%
black district (Texas 18th).41
A total of thirteen new majority black congressional districts
were drawn during the 1990s round of redistricting.4' All of these
districts, as well as the four majority black districts that carried over
from the 1980s, elected an African American to Congress in 1992.
Furthermore, every African American serving in Congress from the
South was elected from one of these majority black districts. Table 1
lists the election results for all majority black congressional districts in
the South.43
41. The Texas 18th was not a majority-white district; however, it was 39% black, 27%
Hispanic and 1% Asian. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1990, at 1201 (1989).
42. This total includes the Texas 18th, which was redrawn in 1992 to be 51% black.
43. See generally Orville Vernon Burton, Legislative and Congressional Districting in
South Carolina, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING, supra note 32, at 290; Richard L.
Engstrom & Jason F. Kirksey, Race and Representational Districting in Louisiana; in
RACE AND REDISTRICTING, supra note 32, at 229; Winnett W. Hagens, The Politics of
Race: The Virginia Redistricting Experience, 1991-97, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING,
supra note 32, at 315; Robert A. Holmes, Reapportionment Strategies in the 1990s: The
Case of Georgia; in RACE AND REDISTRICTING, supra note 32, at 191; Patrick Sellers, et
al., Congressional Redistricting in North Carolina; in RACE AND REDISTRICTING, supra
note 32, at 269 (providing a detailed description of the redistricting process in several of
these southern states).
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Table 1: Congressional Election Results in Majority Black Districts in the
South, 1992-1998
% Black % Total Vote For Winner
Congressional Year Total Open or D c Demcratic G Race Of
District Incumbent Winner
Population Primary Runoff Election
AL 7 (Hilliard) 1992 67 open seat 31 50 70 B
FL 3 (Brown) 1992 55 new seat 43 64 59 B
FL 17 (Meek) 1992 59 new seat 83 no runoff unopposed B
FL 23 (Hastings) 1992 52 new seat 28 58 59 B
GA 2 (Bishop) 1992 57 WI 21 53 64 B
GA 5 (Lewis) 1992 62 BI 76 no runoff 72 B
GA 11 (MeKinney) 1992 64 new seat 31 56 73 B
LA 2 (Jefferson) 1992 61 BI 73 no runoff no GE B
LA 4 (Fields) 1992 67 new seat 48 74 no GE B
MS 2 (Espy) 1992 63 BI unopposed no runoff 76 B
NC 1 (Clayton) 1992 57 new seat 31 55 67 B
NC 12 (Watt) 1992 57 new seat 47 no runoff 70 B
SC 6 (Clybum) 1992 62 open seat 56 no runoff 65 B
TN 9 (Ford, Sr.) 1992 59 BI 65 no runoff 58 B
TX 18 (Washington) 1992 51 BI unopposed no runoff 65 B
TX 30 (Johnson) 1992 50 new seat 92 no runoff 72 B
VA 3 (Scott) 1992 64 new seat 67 no runoff 79 B
MS 2 (fhompson)* 1993 63 open seat 28 55 no GE B
AL 7 (Hilliard) 1994 67 BI unopposed no runoff 77 B
FL 3 (Brown) 1994 55 BI 67 no runoff 58 B
FL 17 (Meek) 1994 59 BI unopposed no runoff unopposed B
FL 23 (Hastings) 1994 52 BI unopposed no runoff unopposed B
GA 2 (Bishop) 1994 57 BI 67 no runoff 66 B
GA 5 (Lewis) 1994 62 BI unopposed no runoff 69 B
GA 11 (Mecinney) 1994 64 BI unopposed no runoff 66 B
LA 2 (Jefferson) 1994 61 BI 75 no runoff no GE B
LA 4 (Fields) 1994 67 BI 70 no runoff no GE B
MS 2 (Thompson) 1994 63 BI unopposed no runoff 54 B
NC 1 (Clayton) 1994 57 BI unopposed no runoff 61 B
NC 12 (Watt) 1994 57 BI unopposed no runoff 66 B
SC 6 (Clybum) 1994 62 BI 86 no runoff 64 B
TN 9 (Ford, Sr.) 1994 59 BI 79 no runoff 58 B
* Special Election to fill vacancy when Epsy was appointed to Cabinet
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% Black % Total Vote For Winner
Congressional Y T Open or D ti D ti G Race Of
District ear o Incumbent D D ne Winner
Population Primary Runoff Election
TX 18 (Lee)** 1994 51 BI 63 no runoff 73 B
TX 30 (Johnson) 1994 50 BI unopposed no runoff 73 B
VA 3 (Scott) 1994 64 BI convention no runoff 79 B
AL 7 (Hilliard) 1996 67 BI unopposed no runoff 71 B
FL 17 (Meek) 1996 59 BI unopposed no runoff 89 B
FL 23 (Hastings) 1996 52 BI unopposed no runoff 73 B
GA 5 (Lewis) 1996 62 BI unopposed no runoff unopposed B
LA 2 (Jefferson) 1996 61 BI unopposed no runoff no GE B
MS 2 (Thompson) 1996 63 BI unopposed no runoff 60 B
SC 6 (Clybum) 1996 62 BI 88 no runoff 69 B
TN 9 (Ford, Jr.) 1996 59 BI 60 no runoff 61 B
VA 3 (Scott) 1996 64 BI convention no runoff 82 B
AL 7 (Hilliard) 1998 67 BI unopposed no runoff unopposed B
FL 17 (Meek) 1998 59 BI unopposed no runoff unopposed B
FL 23 (Hastings) 1998 52 BI unopposed no runoff unopposed B
GA 5 (Lewis) 1998 62 BI unopposed no runoff 79 B
LA 2 (Jefferson) 1998 61 BI 86 no runoff no GE B
MS 2 (Thompson) 1998 63 BI unopposed no runoff 71 B
SC 6 (Clybum) 1998 62 BI 83 no runoff 73 B
TN 9 (Ford, Jr.) 1998 59 BI unopposed no runoff 79 B
VA 3 (Scott) 1998 54 BI convention no runoff 76 B
** Black challenger, Sheila Jackson Lee, defeated black incumbent, Craig Washington, in Democratic primary
The five black incumbents easily won re-election in 1992-most
with more than 70% of the vote. Only three of the five incumbents
had primary opposition, and none of the incumbents had to compete
in a runoff. On the other hand, there were primaries in all of the
newly created majority black districts with the exception of the Texas
18th, which had a black incumbent, Craig Washington, representing it
in 1992. The Democratic primaries in seven of the newly created
black districts (the Alabama 7th, the Florida 3rd and 23rd, the
Georgia 2nd and 11th, the Louisiana 4th, and the North Carolina 1st)
produced runoffs. In all seven of these districts, black candidates
defeated their opponents in the runoff and then proceeded to win the
general election as well-often with vote percentages well in excess of
60%. In the other five newly created districts (the Florida 17th,
North Carolina 12th, the South Carolina 6th, the Texas 30th and the
Virginia 3rd), black candidates won the Democratic primary outright,
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and then defeated their Republican challengers in the general
election, again with a substantial percentage of the vote.
In only one of the thirteen newly created black districts listed in
table 1 did a white incumbent seek re-election in 1992-all of the
other districts were drawn with no incumbents in them, or with
incumbents who had indicated (in most cases prior to redistricting)
that they did not plan to run again in 1992. The one white incumbent
who did run for re-election, Charles Hatcher in the Georgia 2nd
congressional district, forced a runoff in the Democratic primary, but
was subsequently defeated in that runoff by a black candidate.
4
In 1994, all of these black incumbents, with the exception of
Washington (Texas 18th), easily won re-election in their districts. A
black challenger, Sheila Jackson Lee, defeated Washington in the
Democratic primary; Lee then went on to win the general election.
Only five of these seventeen black incumbents had primary
opposition-Brown (Florida 3rd), Bishop (Georgia 2nd), Clyburn
(South Carolina 6th), Ford, Sr. (Tennessee 9th) and Washington
(Texas 18th). This pattern was repeated in 1996 and 1998 in the
majority black districts; all the black incumbents running in majority
black districts were re-elected in 1996 and 1998, most without any
primary opposition.
A number of the majority-minority districts that elected African
Americans to Congress in 1992 and 1994 were later dismantled when
the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a series of cases beginning in 1993
with Shaw v. Reno,45 that districts drawn predominantly on the basis
of race violated the Equal Protection Clause. In fact, over the course
of the decade, courts ordered the redrawing of nine majority-black
congressional districts in six southern states: Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.46
Majority black districts were redrawn in Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, and Texas for the 1996 elections and in North Carolina
44. Despite the revelation that Hatcher had accumulated 819 overdrafts on the House
bank, he received 40% of the vote in the Democratic primary, and 47% of the vote in the
runoff. The African-American candidate, Sanford Bishop, however, received 53% of the
vote in the Democratic runoff, and went on to win the general election against a white
Republican with 64% of the vote. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN PoLrIcs 1994, at 338 (1994).
45. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
46. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985-86 (1996) (Texas); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 927-28 (1995) (Georgia); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-658 (1993) (North
Carolina); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1997) (Virginia); Johnson
v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1552 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (Florida); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.
Supp. 1188, 1209 (W.D. La. 1993) (Louisiana).
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and Virginia for the 1998 elections.4 7  The black population
concentrations in eight of these districts fell below 50% black.48
Despite the substantial decrease in the number of black voters,
African-American incumbents in all of these districts other than the
Louisiana 4th sought re-election in the newly configured districts.
Contrary to the expectations of many observers, all proved successful
in their bids for re-election.
Table 2 lists the election results for seven of the eight districts
that were redrawn as less than majority black as a result of successful
court challenges-the Louisiana 4th is not included in the table
because the black incumbent did not seek re-election, and no other
black candidate ran in the redrawn district. Despite the decrease in
black population,49 the black incumbents in all five of the other
districts redrawn for the 1996 elections were re-elected. ° In the
Florida 3rd, Brown was unopposed in the primary and won the
general election with 61% of the vote-more than she had received in
her two previous bids for office in the district. In Georgia, both
Bishop and McKinney faced white candidates in their respective
Democratic primaries, and both received a sufficient percentage of
the vote to avoid a runoff. Bishop and McKinney both went on to
win the general election against white Republicans-Bishop with
54% of the vote and McKinney with 58% of the vote. In Texas, both
African Americans won re-election with over 50% of the vote in all-
party primaries.5'
47. Although the South Carolina 6th was also challenged, the case was settled in 1997
with an agreement that the South Carolina General Assembly would redraw the districts
by the end of the session in 2000. See Burton, supra note 43, at 290.
48. The black populations in the Florida 3rd, the Georgia 2nd and 11th, the Louisiana
4th, the North Carolina 1st and 12th, and the Texas 18th and 30th fell below 50%. The
Virginia 3rd went from 64% to 54% black when it was redrawn.
49. The Florida 3rd congressional district went from 55% black to 47% black; the
Texas 18th, which was 51% black, and the Texas 30th, which was 50% black, both went to
45% black; the Georgia 2nd went from 57% black to 39% black, and McKinney, who had
run for office in the Georgia 11th, which was 64% black in 1992 and 1994, ran as an
incumbent in 1996 in the Georgia 4th, which was 37% black.
50. The black incumbents won re-election in the remaining majority-minority districts
as well. In North Carolina, the 1996 elections were held under the old district
configurations. Neither Clayton nor Watt faced primary opposition, and both won the
general election against white Republican challengers with large percentages of the vote
(Clayton won with 66% of the vote and Watt with 71% of the vote). Scott won the
general election in the Virginia 3rd with 82% of the vote. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
POLITICS IN AMERICA 1998: THE 105TH CONGRESS 1067, 1092,1487 (Philip D. Duncan &
Christine C. Lawrence eds., 1997).
51. A federal three-judge panel redrew both the 18th and 30th Congressional Districts
after the regular 1996 primary and required these two districts to have all-party (or
"open") primaries on the same day as the general election. Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp.
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Table 2: Congressional Election Results in Redrawn Districts,
1996 & 1998
Primary General
Open
Congressional Year % Black Or % Total % Total
District Pop Incumbent Votes For ace Of Votes For Race Of(Race)Winner(Rac) Winner WinrBlack Cand. Winner
FL 3 (Brown) 1996 47 BI unopposed B 61 B
GA 2 (Bishop) 1996 39 BI 59 B 54 B
GA 4 (hcKinney) 1996 37 BI 67 B 58 B
NC 1 (Clayton) 1996 57 BI unopposed B 66 B
NC 12 (Watt) 1996 62 BI unopposed B 71 B
TX 18 (Lee)* 1996 45 BI 77 B no GE B
TX 30 (Johnson)* 1996 45 BI 55 B no GE B
FL 3 (Brown) 1998 47 BI unopposed B 55 B
GA 2 (Bishop) 1998 39 BI unopposed B 57 B
GA 4 (McKinney) 1998 37 BI unopposed B 61 B
NC 1 (Clayton) 1998 50 BI 67 B 62 B
NC 12 (Watt) 1998 36 BI 84 B 56 B
TX 18 (Lee) 1998 45 BI unopposed B 90 B
TX 30 (Johnson) 1998 45 BI unopposed B 72 B
* All-party primary in Texas in 1996
When the two majority black districts in North Carolina were
redrawn for the 1998 elections, the North Carolina 1st went from 57%
to 50% black and the North Carolina 12th went from 62% to 36%
black. Both black incumbents faced Democratic primary opposition,
and won handily. Moreover, both also won the general election
against white Republicans-Clayton with 62% of the vote and Watt
with 56% of the vote.52
1341, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Because both incumbents received over 50% of the vote, no
runoff (or general election) was required.
52. In 1998, despite a district with substantially fewer black voters (the black
percentage in the Virginia 3rd fell from 64% to 54% black when it was redrawn as a result
of a court challenge), Scott again won the general election with ease-this time with 76%
of the vote (compared to 79% of the vote in 1994 and 82% in 1996). MICHAEL BARONE
& GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1451 (1998) (providing the pre-
redrawing statistics for Virginia 3rd); MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1644 (2000) (providing the post-redrawing statistics for Virginia
3rd). Black incumbents also won re-election (without primary opposition) in the five
districts redrawn in 1996-Brown with 55% of the vote in the Florida 3rd; Bishop with
57% of the vote in the Georgia 2nd and McKinney with 61% of the vote in the Georgia
4th; and Lee with 90% of the vote in Texas 18th and Johnson with 72% of the vote in the
Texas 30th. Id. at 1644, 400, 465, 1561, 470, 1592 (providing the statistics presented in
order by page number).
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Why did these black incumbents continue to win despite having
to run from districts that were no longer majority black? Did the
level of racially polarized voting decrease over the course of the
decade-that is, were whites more likely to vote for black candidates
in 1996 and 1998 than they were in 1992 or 1994? Or was it because,
as suggested by Representative McKinney herself,53 these African-
American candidates had the benefit of being the incumbents in these
districts? In fact, little evidence supports either of these contentions.
Studies of several of these congressional contests by a number of
different researchers have yielded similar conclusions: voting in these
congressional contests was racially polarized and the levels of racial
bloc voting did not decrease over the course of the decade.5 4 Using
estimates produced by Professor Charles Bullock and Richard Dunn,
we examined voting patterns in these congressional elections.55
As is evident in table 3-which simply summarizes estimates
derived by Bullock and Dunn of the percentage of black and white
voters casting ballots for the black candidate56-a clear pattern of
53. Cynthia McKinney, A Product of the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST, Nov. 26,
1996, at A15.
54. See, e.g., T. Baxter, Georgia Campaign '96: Primaries Offer Some Indications State
Voting Patterns Changing, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 1, 1996, at 2C; M.A. Fletcher, New
Tolerance In The South Or Old Power Of Incumbency? Blacks Won In Five Redrawn
Mostly White Districts, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al; C. Helton, Georgia Analysis:
McKinney, Bishop Show Blacks Can Win In Majority-White Districts, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Nov. 6, 1996, at 3C; D. Stephen Voss & David Lublin, Black Incumbents, White
Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections, AM. POL. RES., Mar. 2001, at
141-82. Each of these authorities reach similar conclusions regarding voting patterns in
the Georgia congressional contests using ecological inference to derive their estimates.
55. Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1226,1232-35 (1999).
56. Bullock and Dunn produced estimates of voting patterns by race for each election
contest using three standard statistical methods: homogeneous precinct analysis,
ecological regression and ecological inference. Id. at 1223-24. Homogeneous precinct
analysis involves comparing the voting behavior of precincts that are racially
homogeneous (in this case, racially homogeneous is defined as 90% or more of the
registered voters are either black or white). Ecological regression involves applying
ordinary least squared regression to data that has been aggregated, in this case to the
precinct level. For further explanation of these two statistical techniques, see, for
example, BERNARD GROPMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST
FOR VOTING EQUALITY 84-88 (1992). Ecological inference, as developed by Gary King,
incorporates maximum likelihood statistics to produce estimates of voting patterns by
race. See generally GARY KING, A SOLUTION To THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE
PROBLEM (1997) (describing this statistical procedure); Bernard Grofman, A Primer on
Racial Bloc Voting, in THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM: CENSUS 2000 DATA AND
REDISTRICTING TECHNOLOGY (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000) (providing a less technical
overview intended for the lay audience). In most instances, Bullock and Dunn produced
similar estimates for each election contest utilizing these three methods, and rather than
choosing to report one estimate over the other two, we averaged the three estimates and
report the average of these estimates in tables 3 and 4.
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racial bloc voting exists in these elections. Almost all black voters
cast a ballot for the African-American candidate, while only about a
third of the white voters voted for the African-American candidate.
This pattern appears stable over the course of the decade-the
average percentage of white voters casting their vote for black
candidates in the general election only varied one percentage point
(between 34.1 and 35.1) between 1992 and 1998.11 Also, the
proportion of whites estimated to be voting for black candidates in
the Democratic primary was about the same as the proportion of
whites voting for the black Democrat in the general election . 8
The estimated percentage of the white vote received by each of
the black candidates individually varied, but it was very unusual for a
black candidate to receive majority support from whites. The only
black congressional candidate in our data-set to receive a majority of
the white vote appeared to be Scott (3rd congressional district in
Virginia), in 1992 and possibly 1994.59 White voters in the South
Carolina 6th appeared most reluctant to vote for the black incumbent,
Clyburn, although his support among white voters gradually increased
over the course of the decade. Clyburn, however, appears to be the
only black candidate who clearly benefited from his incumbency
status among white voters. Brown and Watt show sporadic increases
in white support, but Clayton and McKinney appear to have actually
57. This finding is supported by others-mostly news reporters-writing on the
subject. Reporters appear to have based their conclusions primarily on two sources:
homogeneous precinct analysis estimates reported by the Associated Press and ecological
regression estimates produced by David Bositis, a senior political analyst at the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 54; Fletcher, supra
note 54; Helton, supra note 54; Voss & Lublin, supra note 54 (reaching similar conclusions
regarding voting patterns in the Georgia congressional contests using ecological inference
to derive their estimates).
58. The fact that the same percentage of whites vote for the black candidate in the
Democratic primary as in the general election is somewhat counter-intuitive, at least if a
large proportion of whites are Republican. For instance, if only 20% of the white voters
are Democrats, then we would expect, at most, 20% of the white vote to be cast for the
black Democrat in the general election. Equal white crossover percentages in both the
primary and the general election make sense if, say, one-third of the white voters are
Democrats-and all of these white voters are willing to vote for the black Democrat rather
than cross party lines to vote for a white Republican but only one-third of these voters
were willing to vote for a black candidate in the Democratic primary. Similarly, for white
crossover rates in the primary and the general election to be equal, for example, if more
than one-third of the white voters are Democrats, some white voters must be crossing
party lines in the general election rather than voting for a black Democratic candidate.
59. We do not know if Scott continued to enjoy this level of support among white
voters throughout the decade, (Le., no estimates of white and black votes for Scott are
reported for 1996 or 1998 by Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34) but his high vote totals in
1996 and 1998 suggest that he did.
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lost white support since their first election in 1992. The conclusion
that some of these African-American incumbents did not reap the
usual benefits of being incumbents is reached by Bullock and Dunn,6
as well as by Voss and Lublin.61
Table 3: Voting Patterns by Race in Selected 1992 Majority Black
Congressional Districts, 1992-1998*
Devocrtsic PeieIr Dennocratio~ueoif General Section
Congressional yea, % Black % White % Black % White % Black % While
Distric Vote For Votes For RaceOf VotesFor Votes For Race Of Vote For Votes For RaceOf
Blk Cand Blk Cand Cands Blk Cands* Blk Cods0  Cods Blk Cands* Blk Caeds* Cnds(Cohesion) (Crosover) (Cohesion) (Crossover) (Cohesion) (Crossover)
FL3 (Brown) 1992 93.5 34.4 3B/IW 92 15.8 BW 97.1 25.6 BIW
GA 2 (Bisop) 1992 84.4 31.2 4B/2W 79 25.5 B1W 99.3 32.4 BW
GA I (M ooKiey) 1992 89.71 60.4 4B/IW 90.8 26.5 E/W 96.7 36.0 B/V
NC I (Clayton) 1992 89.7 7.1 4B/3W 94.9 2.2 B/W 96.6 34.3 2B/IW
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1992 M M M Noetmoff 97.7 24.2 BW
VA 3 (Sco) 1992 M M M No =soff 97.2 554 B/
GA 2 (Bishop) 1994 M M M No tmoff 96.7 404 BW
GAl (McKinncy) 1994 noprimaty Noruioff 96.4 293 BW
NC I (Clayton) 1994 no primrry No moff 97.1 30.6 BJW
NC 12 (Watt) 1994 noprimtary Nonmoff 98.7 32.9 B/V
SC 6 (Clybu) 1994 M I M 2B Norunoff 973 27.7 EM
VA 3 (Scolt) 1994 noprimary No noff 98.9 49.6 B/W
FL 3 (Brown) 1996 no pdary Norunoff 98.2 36.9 BiW
GA 2 (Bishop) 1996 M M ? No rnoff 98.4 37.2 B9W
GA4(McKinney) 1996 933 24.6 IB13W No runoff 98.1 31.2 B9W
NC I (Clayton) 1996 no primary Noeunoff 98.9 30.3 B/
NC 12 (Wat) 1996 no prmary No eoff 99.1 37.1 B/W
SC 6 (Clybun) 1996 M 2B No noff 973 31.9
GA2(Bshop) 1998 nopimnary Noruoff 97.9 39.5 BW
GA 4 (McKinney) 1998 no pinan y No r off 95.1 36.0 2B
NC I (Clayton) 1998 M M M No nroff 983 30.2 B/W
NC 12 (Watt) 1998 M M M No runoff 98.9 340 BW
SC 6 (Clbuo) 1998 M M No rtsoff 98.9 33.3 BW
n Estitatus ofracial block voting taks frost Bullock & Dunn (1999); estimates of% white and black vole for black candidates. the % of white & black oting for
any of the black candidates; M-nissing data
60. Bullock and Dunn conclude that "the white vote share increased with the tenure
of some black members, but in other cases white support fell." Bullock & Dunn, supra
note 34, at 1235.
61. McKinney actually garnered more support from whites who were new to her
district (whites that were not in the old 11th District), than from whites she had previously
served: McKinney "won 30.5% of the white vote in the new precincts... compared to
28.9% in her old ones." Voss & Lublin, supra note 54, at 21.
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The level of district support for these black Democratic
incumbents was on par with the support given to incumbent
Democratic President Bill Clinton-in most of these districts, in fact,
the black congressional candidate actually received a higher
percentage of the votes cast in the 1996 general election than did
Clinton.62 Can we assume from this statistic that black Democratic
candidates are likely to receive as high a percentage of the white vote
as white Democratic candidates? No. Bullock and Dunn conclude
that the answer is "No." On the basis of two separate analyses, they
found that white Democrats running for Congress had a "roughly ten
point advantage" in attracting white votes in general elections than a
comparable black Democrat.63
Despite an unmistakable pattern of racially polarized voting and
little evidence of an incumbency advantage for these black
candidates, these African-American incumbents continued to win
election to Congress even after their districts were no longer majority
black. If they did not succeed because whites had become more
willing to vote for them-either because they were simply more
willing to vote for black candidates in general, or because these black
candidates were incumbents-how is it they have continued to win?
The simple answer is that these black candidates probably did not
need super-majority black districts to win in the first place, at least so
long as they ran in districts without a white incumbent.
64
B. Factors that Affect the Opportunity to Elect Minority-Preferred
Candidates: Data from the U.S. House of Representatives
The likelihood of electing a minority-preferred candidate to
office depends on several factors: the relative rate at which minorities
62. The exception to this rule was McKinney, who received 58% of the vote in the
Georgia 4th in 1996, compared to the 64% received by Clinton in this district.
63. Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1250. Bullock and Dunn first compared the
average share of white votes in general elections for all black and white candidates, and
for black and white candidates who competed as incumbents, as challengers and in open
seats and found that "[a]mong incumbents, African Americans drew nine to thirteen
percentage points less of the white vote than did white members of Congress. Whites also
had an advantage in open seats, taking three to eight more percentage points of white
support than did black candidates." Id. at 1249. These authors also used a regression
model to determine that, controlling for the electoral status of the contest, the "race
variable" was positive and indicated that "whites drew about ten percentage points more
of the white vote than did a comparable black." Id. at 1250.
64. Evidence for this contention can be found in the large margin of victories by
which these black candidates won office when their districts were still majority black. In
Georgia, for example, Bishop won 64% of the vote in 1992 and 66% of the vote in 1994,
and McKinney won 73% of the vote in 1992 and 66% of the vote in 1994.
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and whites participate in the electoral process, the degree to which
minority and white voters support minority-preferred candidates, and
the fact that the United States has a multi-stage electoral process that
includes a primary election, a general election, and sometimes a run-
off election as well. In order to determine the percentage minority
necessary to provide minorities with an equal opportunity to elect
minority candidates, all of these factors must be considered. Our
conceptual framework incorporates each of these factors: We begin
by calculating the percentage black needed to equalize turnout for
minority and white voters; we then incorporate cohesion and
crossover voting into the model, and finally we take into account the
multi-stage election process (by incorporating primaries, runoffs and
general elections into the model).
While we can estimate participation rates and cohesion and
crossover levels from previous elections, a number of factors not
taken into account by this framework can also affect the ability of
blacks to elect minority-preferred candidates. This requires us to be
sensitive to context. Perhaps the most important of these factors is
the presence of a white incumbent in the district. Other factors
include the availability of experienced minority candidates and
campaign organizers and minority access to campaign funding. Other
potential complications with calculating the percentage black
required to provide black voters with an opportunity to elect include
the presence of military bases, universities, and colleges-because
military personnel and students are often registered to vote
elsewhere-as well as prisons in the district.65
1. Equalizing Black and White Turnout
Blacks usually require more than a simple majority in a district if
they are to comprise 50% of the voters on election day. Several
reasons explain this fact: (1) the voting age population is typically a
lower proportion of the total population among blacks than whites,
(2) registration rates are often lower for blacks than whites, and (3)
turnout rates are often lower for blacks than whites.66 Thus, even if
blacks constitute 50% of the overall population in a district, they
often do not make up 50% of the voters casting ballots on election
65. The presence of a prison, and the prohibition on felon voting, complicates the
calculation because minorities are disproportionately represented in prisons, making it
more difficult to estimate participation rates and voting patterns by race.
66. See generally Brace et al., supra note 33 (referencing data on registration and
turnout by rate).
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day.67
If black and white participation rates are known, calculating the
percent black population needed in a district to equalize black and
white turnout is a simple matter.61 We rarely have this data, however,
and must usually estimate levels of black and white participation.6 9
67. Another factor that can be taken into account in calculating equalizing
percentages is roll-off. "Roll-off" occurs when voters fail to cast a vote for offices below
that at the top of the ballot. Roll-off often disproportionately affects minority voters.
Although we do not have this data for the congressional elections we examine, we are able
to include roll-off in our calculations for state legislative office in South Carolina. An
additional factor is the differential rate of ballot spoilage-a controversial topic in the
Florida recount. See, e.g., John Mintz & Dan Keating, Florida Ballot Spoilage Likelier for
Blacks; Voting Machines, Confusion Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,2000, at Al.
68. We calculate the equalizing percentage mathematically by solving the following
equation:
Let:
M = the proportion of the district's total population that is black.
W = 1 - M = the proportion of the district's total population that is white.
A = the proportion of the black population that turned out to vote.
B = the proportion of the white population that turned out to vote.
Therefore,
M(A) = the proportion of total population that is black and turned out to vote (1)
(1 - M)B = the proportion of total population that is white and turned out to vote (2)
We want to find out what value of M is needed for (1) and (2) to be equal. Algebraically,
we set them equal and solve for M:
M(A) = (1- M)B
M(A) = B - M(B)
M(A) + M(B) = B
M(A + B) = B
M = B I (A + B)
Thus, for example, if 57.8% of the black population turned out and 68.6% of the white
population turned out,
M = 0.686 / (0.686 + 0.578) = 0.5427
Or 54.3%-thus, if 54.3% of the population in the district is black, blacks will make up
50% of the turnout on election day. See Brace et al., supra note 33, at 48.
69. Very few states collect this data (only a handful of southern states collect
registration data by race, and only South Carolina collect turnout by race), therefore it is
usually necessary to produce estimates of registration and turnout by race. This procedure
begins with the creation of a precinct level database containing both voting age population
by race (or registration by race, if available) and election returns (including total
registration and total turnout). Precinct election returns can usually be obtained from the
county election commission (or sometimes from the Secretary of State's office). Precinct
demographic data (voting age population by race), however, has traditionally been much
harder to obtain (although this will change with the release of the Census Bureau's P.L.
94-171 redistricting data for the 2000 round of redistricting) because the Census Bureau
reports racial data at the census block level-and not at the precinct level. Maps depicting
precinct boundaries must be compared with census maps to compile a list of the census
blocks that compose each precinct. Once this list is complete, it is possible to aggregate
these census blocks up to the precinct level and compute voting age population figures by
race for each precinct. And once the voting age population by race for each precinct has
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For the congressional races we are interested in examining, we
will make use of the estimates of the percentage of black and white
registered voters who turned out to vote calculated by Bullock and
Dunn.7 Utilizing these estimates, we calculated the percent black
registered voters needed to equalize black and white turnout in each
of the districts. These estimates are listed in table 4.
Table 4: Percent Black Registration Needed to Equalize Black & White
Turnout: Southern Congressional Districts, General Elections, 1992-1998
% Black
Congressional Year % Black % White Needed To
District Participation Participation Equalize
Turnout
FL 3 (Brown) 1992 57.8 68.6 54.3
GA 2 (Bishop) 1992 55.9 62.6 52.8
GA 11 (McKinney) 1992 60.3 57.8 48.9
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1992 63.2 78.3 55.3
GA 2 (Bishop) 1994 38.7 47.3 55.0
GA 11 (McKinney) 1994 39.0 49.1 55.7
NC 1 (Clayton) 1994 36.0 44.8 55.4
NC 12 (Watt) 1994 32.0 38.4 54.5
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1994 48.4 64.6 57.2
FL 3 (Brown) 1996 49.4 59.1 54.5
GA 2 (Bishop) 1996 42.3 58.3 58.0
GA 4 (McKinney) 1996 58.3 66.4 53.2
NC 1 (Clayton) 1996 45.4 56.2 55.3
NC 12 (Watt) 1996 49.0 55.3 53.0
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1996 54.3 63.7 54.0
GA 2 (Bishop) 1998 37.8 42.9 53.2
GA 4 (McKinney) 1998 45.6 50.5 52.5
NC 1 (Clayton) 1998 38.1 41.6 52.2
NC 12 (Watt) 1998 35.7 42.4 54.3
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1998 46.4 51.2 52.5
In almost all the districts listed, whites turned out at higher rates
than blacks in the general elections examined, hence the percent
been calculated, we have the information we need to conduct a statistical analysis that
allows us to estimate the percentage of blacks and whites who registered, turned out and
voted for specific candidates. The statistical procedures used to produce these estimates
are briefly described above. See supra note 56. For a more detailed description of data
availability and the problems associating with building a precinct level database, see
GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 93-94 and Brace et al., supra note 33, at 57-58.
70. Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1226,1232-35.
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black needed to equalize black and white turnout is greater than 50%
in most of these districts. The only exception to this rule was the 1992
general election for the 11th Congressional District in Georgia-
where over 60% of the blacks registered to vote cast a ballot
compared to a little less than 58% of the whites. As a result, the
equalization percent for this particular contest is slightly less than
50% (48.9%).
2. Incorporating Cohesion and Crossover Voting into the Model
The phrase "effective voting equality" has been used in the past
to mean the percentage black population needed to yield an expected
equality of black and white turnout on election day.7' Equalizing
black and white turnout, however, is not the best indicator of whether
minority voters will have an equal opportunity to elect minority
candidates. We also need to incorporate the level of minority
cohesion and the degree of white crossover voting that can be
expected when a minority-preferred candidate competes for office.
If, for example, white voters regularly cross over to vote for black
candidates, the percentage black necessary to create an effective
black district decreases.
Table 5 lists our calculations of the percent black registered
voters needed for a black candidate to have an equal opportunity to
win (that is, receive 50% of the vote) in the general election in each of
the districts based on the Bullock and Dunn estimates of black and
white participation rates and black and white votes for African-
American candidates in that district.72 The estimates of percent black
necessary for black-preferred candidates to win the general election,
given the levels of black and white participation and given the degree
of black cohesion and white crossover for black candidates, is less
71. See, e.g., GROFMAN ETAL., supra note 56, at 118-120.
72. Once these estimates have been derived statistically, incorporating black cohesion
and white crossover into the equation is straightforward. For an explanation of how these
estimates, as well as estimates of registration and turnout by race, are produced, see supra
note 53. Using the mathematical formula outlined supra note 68 and substituting "A"
with "vote for the black candidate" and "B" with "vote for the white candidate (rather
than the proportions of the black and white population that turned out to vote), the
percentage black needed to produce 50% of the vote for the black candidate can be
calculated. The vote for the black candidate is a product of the percent black participation
and the proportion of black votes for the black candidate (black cohesion) plus the
product of the percent white participation and the proportion of white votes for the black
candidate (white crossover). The vote for the white candidate is, of course, a product of
the percent black participation and the proportion of black votes for the white candidate
plus the product of the percent white participation and the proportion of white votes for
the white candidate (white bloc vote).
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than 50% in every instance, and in most cases is in the range of 33%-
39% black.73 This is because, even though blacks are typically turning
out to vote at lower rates than whites, blacks are voting very
cohesively-over 95% of the black voters consistently voted for the
black Democrat in a general election-and approximately one-third
of the white voters supported the black Democrat in the general
election.
Table 5: Percent Black Needed for Black Candidate to Win, Incorporating
Cohesion & Crossover: Selected Southern Congressional Districts with a
Black Candidate General Elections, 1992-1998*
% Black% Black % White Needed
Congressional Year % Black % White Votes For Votes For Given Both
District Participation Participation Black Cand Black Cand Cohesion &
(Cohesion) (Crossover) Crossover
FL 3 (Brown) 1992 57.8 68.6 97.1 25.6 41.7
GA 2 (Bishop) " 1992 55.9 62.6 98.3 32.4 36.5
GA 11 (McKinney) 1992 60.3 57.8 96.7 36.0 33.0
SC 6 (Clybucn) 1992 63.2 78.3 97.7 24.2 43.0
GA 2 (Bishop) 1994 38.7 47.3 96.7 40.4 34.3
GA 11 (McKinney) 1994 39.0 49.1 96.4 29.3 41.0
NC I (Clayton) 1994 36.0 44.8 97.1 30.6 39.8
NC 12 (Watt) 1994 32.0 38.4 98.7 32.9 37.2
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1994 48.4 64.6 97.3 27.7 42.5
FL 3 (Brown) 1996 49.4 59.1 98.2 36.9 35.2
GA 2 (Bishop) 1996 42.3 58.3 98.4 37.2 37.1
GA 4 (McKinney) 1996 58.3 66.4 98.1 31.2 37.5
NC I (Clayton) 1996 45.4 56.2 98.9 30.3 39.0
NC 12 (Watt) 1996 49.0 55.3 99.1 37.1 33.8
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1996 54.3 63.7 97.3 31.9 38.0
GA 2 (Bishop) 1998 37.8 42.9 97.9 39.5 33.1
GA 4 (McKinney) 1998 45.6 50.5 95.1 36.0 36.0
NC I (Clayton) 1998 38.1 41.6 98.3 30.2 37.2
NC 12 (Watt) 1998 35.7 42.4 98.9 34.0 36.3
SC 6 (Clyburn) 1998 46.4 51.2 98.9 33.3 35.5
* Participation racial bloc voting estimates derived from Bullock & Dunn (1999).
73. An examination of table 5 indicates that McKinney got 58% of the vote in 1996 in
a district that is 36.6% black in total population, despite a percent needed to win
prediction of 37.5% black registration. The reason for this is that in the Georgia 4th
blacks are registered at a higher rate than whites and this district is actually 42.2% black in
total registration. See Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1215. (Presumably a similar
explanation holds for the North Carolina 12th, in which Watt received 56% of the vote in
1998 in a district that is 35.6% black, despite a percent needed to win prediction of 36.3%
black registration-but we do not have the registration data necessary to confirm this.).
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In the 1990s in the southern congressional districts examined
here, the cohesive black support offered to black candidates and the
consistent white crossover vote of about 33% for these candidates
appears to have been sufficient to provide black voters with an
opportunity to elect minority candidates to office from districts that
were less than majority black. We must be careful, however, in what
conclusions we draw from the above analyses because we have only
been looking at the percent needed to win a general election.
3. Incorporating the Primary and Runoff Elections into the Model
In the United States, a candidate often must compete in and win
a primary election-and sometimes a runoff election as well-before
she can proceed to the general election. Our calculation of the
percent black needed to create an effective minority district should
not ignore this multi-stage election process.
This Article offers a simple formal model of the multi-stage
election process. Using this model, we show that the growing
Republicanism of white voters in the South has a double-edged effect
on the likelihood of black electoral success: for a given black
population proportion in the district, ceteris paribus, as the
Republican share among white voters goes up, black candidates are
more likely to win the primary, but less likely to win the general
election. In this model, the overall probability of black electoral
success is the product of these two probabilities. We outline this
model in the Appendix. Below we apply this model to those primary
and runoff elections for which Bullock and Dunn provide estimates of
voting patterns by race.
Table 6 displays the percent black population needed to win the
Democratic primary and the Democratic runoff, again based on
estimates of black and white voting behavior reported by Bullock and
Dunn.
Table 6 lists far fewer elections for two reasons. First, in many
instances black incumbents did not face a primary challenge or, with
the exception of 1992, a runoff election. Second, Bullock and Dunn
did not report estimates on black and white participation and voting
patterns in a number of instances when the black incumbent had an
opponent in the Democratic primary. As table 6 demonstrates, the
percent black needed to win the Democratic primary is usually
considerably lower than the percent needed to win the runoff or the
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general election74 -and sometimes the highest percentage is in the
runoff, sometimes in the general election. Both Bishop and
McKinney, for example, needed a higher percentage black to win the
Democratic runoff than to win the general election in their districts in
1992.
The highest of the three percentages necessarily interests us most
because it is the percentage needed for the black-preferred candidate
to win all three elections-the Democratic primary, the Democratic
runoff and the general election-and attain a seat in the legislature.
The fact that the highest percentage black needed to win is not always
found in the general election illustrates the importance of examining
74. The percent black needed to win the Democratic primary is somewhat misleading
if more than one black candidate ran in the primary-the estimates for the percentage of
whites crossing over and the percentage of blacks voting cohesively are a reflection of the
percentage of whites and blacks voting for any of the black candidates, not simply the
winning black candidate. For example, in the 1992 Democratic primary in the Georgia
11th, 60.4% of the whites voted for one of the four black candidates running, but not
necessarily the black candidate (McKinney) who won.
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all stages of the election process, and not simply relying on an analysis
of the general election.
Before we conclude that black Democratic candidates can win in
congressional districts that are not majority black, several cautionary
notes must be added. First, black candidates may not have been
persuaded to compete for congressional office in the South if majority
black districts had not been created-and black candidates cannot
win if they cannot be convinced to run. Second, black voters may not
have turned out to vote in such high numbers if they did not think
black-preferred candidates had a chance to win. Third, a district that
was less than majority black may have attracted more experienced
and well-funded white candidates, and that in turn could lower the
level of white crossover voting and result in the defeat of black
candidates. Fourth, white incumbents can play a major role in
retarding the prospects for black electoral success. Only one of the
congressional contests examined included a white incumbent; if white
incumbents had run in more of these districts, the black electoral
success rate almost certainly would have been much lower. For
example, in the Georgia 10th, which is 38% black, a black Democratic
candidate was easily defeated by the white Republican incumbent in
the 1998 general election. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we
must not over-generalize from the congressional data to other offices.
As the data from state legislative districts in South Carolina
demonstrate, sometimes legislative districts well in excess of 50%
black are necessary to provide black voters with an equal opportunity
to elect black candidates to office-a district-specific analysis is
essential to make this determination.
C. Factors that Affect the Opportunity to Elect Minority-Preferred
Candidates: Data from South Carolina State Legislative Elections
Our examination of the outcome of elections in black majority
districts for the South Carolina House of Representatives during the
1990s reinforces the importance of a jurisdiction-specific analysis of
the factors that affect the opportunity to elect minority-preferred
candidates to office. Table 7 lists the election results for all majority
black state house districts in South Carolina for the 1992, 1994, 1996
and 1998 elections. 75
75. Table 7 does not include results from special elections, including the round of
special elections held in 1997 due to court-ordered redistricting.
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Table 7: State House Election Results in Majority Black Districts in South
Carolina, 1992-1998
Primary Runoff General
D Y Tol OpenOr RaceOf
Disrit Y o Incumbent Incumbent %Totl RamOf % Total Ramr Of %otal Rce Of
Votes For Winner i Ver Winner
Winner Winner Winner
23 1992 63 0 -nopposed B normoff B unopposed B
25 1992 58 1 W 68 B noo ff B unopposed B
31 1992 68 1 B unopposed B norunaff B unopposed B
41 1992 56 I W 70 W no runoff W 66 W
49 1992 57 0 51 B nonoff B unopposed B
50 1992 60 1 W 59 W nornzff W unopposed W
51 1992 65 0 unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
57 1992 58 1 W unopposed W normoff W unopposed W
59 1992 57 1 W -nopposed W .oreooff W unopposed W
62 1992 63 0 55 B orunnff B 69 B
64 1992 56 1 W unopposed W norunoff W unopposed W
66 1992 65 0 unopposed B nortmoff B unopposed B
70 1992 61 0 52 B nornmoff B unopposed B
73 1992 71 I B unopposed B nonoff B unopposed B
74 1992 72 0 unopposed B non-off B unopposed B
77 1992 66 0 unopposed B normoff B unopposed B
90 1992 53 1 W unopposed W no nnoff W u=opposed W
93 1992 53 1 W 72 W nounoff W unopposed W
95 1992 64 0 55 B no-noff B 54 B
101 1992 65 0 51 B nonsmoff B unopposed B
102 1992 57 1 B unopposed B nornoff B unopposed B
103 1992 55 1 W unopposed W norunoff W unopposed W
19 1992 52 1 B unopposed B no unoff B 58 B
110 1992 51 I W unopposed W norunoff W 61 W
111 1992 66 0 47 B 99 B unopposed B
116 1992 59 0 unopposed B nounoff B unopposed B
120 1992 55 1 W unopposed W norunoff W unopposed W
122 1992 53 1 B unopposed B notunoff B unopposed B
12 1994 61 1 W 63 B no uoff B 52 W
23 1994 65 1 B unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
25 1994 59 1 B unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
31 1994 68 1 B unopposed B nsunoff B unopposed B
41 1994 61 1 W 61 W nonnoff W 77 W
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Prlny Runoff General
% Black Open Or Race OfDistrit Year Total Incumbent Incumbent % Total RaceOf TowO % TOW RareOf
Pop Votes For Winner Votes Winner Vots For Winner
Winner Winner Winner
49 1994 57 1 B opposed B nomooff B 83 B
50 1994 60 I W 55 W nonuoff W 72 W
51 1994 65 I B noposed B nomrnoff B unopposed B
54 1994 58 1 W unoposed W norunoff W unopposed W
57 1994 58 1 W unopposed W nonemoff W unopposed W
59 1994 56 I W unopposed W noeunoff W nopposed W
62 1994 63 1 B unopposed B no runoff B unopposed B
64 1994 56 1 W 72 W unmoff W unopposed W
66 1994 65 1 B unopposed B nonuoff B unopposed B
70 1994 68 1 B unopposed B norunoff B -opposed B
73 1994 71 1 B unopposed B non-off B unopposed B
74 1994 67 I B 58 B norunoff B unopposed B
76 1994 62 0 76 B no runoff B unopposed B
77 1994 60 1 B unopposed B ronosoff B unopposed B
62 1994 59 0 unopposed B ronosoff B 51 B
91 1994 66 0 49.7 B 68 B 72 B
93 1994 53 1 W unopposed W ounneoff W unopposed W
95 1994 64 1 B unoppsed B no nmoff B unopposed B
101 1994 68 1 B unopposed B nonmoff B unopposed B
102 1994 57 1 B unopposed B snonoff B unopposed B
103 1994 64 1 W 52 B no runoff B unopposed B
109 1994 63 1 B unopposed B no runoff B unopposed B
Ill 1994 65 1 B unopposed B normoff B 73 B
116 1994 59 1 B unopposed B nonoff B 59 B
118 1994 61 1 W unopposed B nonmoff B 78 B
121 1994 61 0 49 B 59 B 57 B
122 1994 59 1 B uopposed B nonoff B 61 B
12 1996 61 I W 56 B nonomoff B 51 B
23 1996 65 0 63 B no rnoff B 72 B
25 1996 59 1 B unopposed B nornoff B 78 B
31 1996 68 0 unopposed B nonmoff B unopposed B
41 1996 61 I W 53 W norunoff W unopposed W
49 1996 57 1 B unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
50 1996 60 1 W 65 W nomoff W unopposed W
51 1996 65 I B unopposed B nonoff B unopposed B
54 1996 58 1 W 79 W nournoff W 85 W
57 1996 56 0 42 W 54 W 79 W
59 1996 56 0 unopposed B no runoff B unopposed B
1414 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
Primary Runoff Gener"l
% Black
Distlet Year Total penr in t % Total % TotalPpt = .o %To lUM Of Ram Of Rom OrPOP Votes For Winner Votes For Voes For Winer
Winner r Winner Wioer Winner
62 1996 63 1 B unopposed B no runoff B unopposed B
64 1996 56 I W unopposed W nounoff W 75 W
66 1996 65 1 B unopposed B nonunoff B 70 B
70 1996 68 I B 67 B nornoff B 77 B
73 1996 71 1 B unopp sed B norunoff B unopposed B
74 1996 67 1 B 55 B non-off B 89 B
76 1996 62 I B unopposed B norunoff B 73 B
77 1996 60 1 B unopposed B nomnoff B 68 B
82 1996 59 I B unopposed B noennoff B 64 B
91 1996 66 1 B unopposed B norenoff B 74 B
93 1996 53 I W unopposed W nonunoff W 50 W
95 1996 64 1 B unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
101 1996 68 I B unopposed B nonsnoff B unopposed B
102 1996 57 O 37 B 53 B unopposed B
103 1996 64 1 B unopposed B nonoff B unopposed B
109 1996 63 0 49 B 59 B unopposed B
111 1996 65 1 B unopposed B norunoff B 76 B
116 1996 59 1 B unopposed B norunoff B 61 B
118 1996 61 1 B unopposed B nonucff B unopposed B
121 1996 61 I B 70 B noenucff B 63 B
122 1996 59 0 66 B nonocff B 57 B
12 1998 51 1 W unopposed B nruncff B 53 B
23 1998 65 1 B unopposed B noruncff B unopposed B
25 1998 59 I B unopposed B nortncff B unopposed B
31 1998 68 1 B unopposed B noeunoff B unopposed B
41 1998 61 1 W unopposed W norunoff W unopposed W
49 1998 57 I B unopposed B nonoff B unopposed B
50 1998 60 1 W 76 W nonoff W 81 W
51 1998 65 1 B unopposed B nounoff B unopposed B
54 1998 50 1 W 77 W nonoff W unopposed W
57 1998 58 1 W 88 W non-off W unopposed W
59 1998 56 1 B unopposed B noe-noff B unopposed B
62 1998 63 1 B unopposed B norunoff B 74 B
64 1998 56 1 W unopposed W norunoff W unopposed W
66 1998 65 1 B unopposed B nornouff B unopposed B
70 1998 68 I B unopposed B nonmos B unopposed B
73 1998 71 1 B unopposed B no runo-f B unopposed B
74 1998 67 I B 59 B no noff B unopposed B
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Primary R-ooff General
% Black OpenOr RatOfT
District Year Total Incumbent Incumbent % TOtW RamOf VoFo TO amO
Pop Votes For W or s For Wer Votes For
Winner Winner Winner
76 1998 62 1 B unopposed B nonmoff B unopposed B
77 1998 60 1 B unopposed B nornoff B 71 B
82 1998 54 1 B unopposed B norunoff B 60 B
91 1998 57 I B unopposed B noronoff B -opposed B
93 1998 53 I W unopposed W norunoff W 56 W
95 1998 64 1 B unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
101 1998 66 I B unopposed B noruoff B -opposed B
102 1998 57 1 B unopposed B norunoff B 69 B
103 1998 57 I B 60 B norunoff B unopposed B
109 1998 63 1 B unopposed B noernoff B 77 B
III 1998 65 1 B unopposed B norunoff B -sopposed B
116 1996 59 1 B unopposed B nosonff B 66 B
118 1998 61 1 B unopposed B normoff B unopposed B
121 1998 52 I B unopposed B norunoff B unopposed B
122 1998 54 1 B unopposed B nonooff B 64 B
As an examination of table 7 shows, a number of majority black
districts failed to elect African Americans to the state legislature. In
fact, whites won thirty of the 124 elections listed. In twenty-nine of
these thirty cases, the whites who won these majority black seats were
incumbents-only one of these thirty white victories occurred in an
election for an open seat. Sixteen of the successful white incumbents
faced no challenger in the Democratic primary, and nineteen had no
opposition in the general election. Over this same time period, only
four white incumbents were defeated by a black challenger in either
the Democratic primary or general election in these majority-black
districts.76
As discussed in sections B.1 and B.2 above, both participation
rates and the degree of cohesion and crossover voting influence the
percent black required for a black candidate to win an election.
South Carolina is a particularly useful state in which to examine
participation rates by race as the state actually collects this data-
there is no need to estimate black and white registration or turnout
76. Two of these four victories occurred in District 12. In 1996, black Democrat Anne
Parks defeated white incumbent Jennings McAbee (Petition, but formerly a Democrat) in
the general election. McAbee, running as a Republican, narrowly defeated Adams in the
1997 special election. Adams unseated McAbee for the second time in the 1998 regular
general election.
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rates. Table 8 lists the percent black total population, voting age
population and voters for all state house elections in majority-black
districts in South Carolina during the 1990s.
Table 8: Percent Needed to Equalize Black & White Voter Turnout: South
Carolina Majority Black State House Districts, General Elections, 1994-1998
% Black % Black
%Bak% Black % White Needed To
District Year Total VAP Voters %Blc %Wht NeddTPop Participation Participation Equalize
Turnout
12 1994 61 57 47 50.8 65.6 56.3
23 1994 65 61 50 48.9 59.4 54.8
25 1994 59 55 57 58.4 64.7 52.6
31 1994 68 62 65 48.5 57.0 54.0
41 1994 61 57 48 52.7 71.1 57.4
49 1994 57 54 45 51.3 62.2 54.8
50 1994 60 56 46 50.8 71.2 58.4
51 1994 65 62 56 50.1 65.4 56.6
54 1994 58 54 46 48.3 54.7 53.1
57 1994 58 53 46 42.0 60.3 58.9
59 1994 56 52 49 55.3 64.3 53.8
62 1994 63 60 55 56.5 69.6 55.2
64 1994 56 51 44 53.9 69.9 56.4
66 1994 65 61 59 58.0 68.6 54.2
70 1994 68 65 69 59.9 63.3 51.4
73 1994 71 68 76 65.9 61.6 48.3
74 1994 67 61 59 52.1 60.2 53.6
76 1994 62 57 58 63.3 67.5 51.6
77 1994 60 57 56 61.7 60.9 49.7
82 1994 59 55 46 54.3 70.6 56.5
91 1994 66 62 53 51.9 65.3 55.7
93 1994 53 49 40 52.4 69.3 56.9
95 1994 64 63 52 53.2 65.2 55.1
101 1994 68 64 55 52.5 71.9 57.8
102 1994 57 53 49 59.3 70.1 54.2
103 1994 64 59 53 50.0 62.2 55.4
109 1994 63 59 58 48.8 57.5 54.1
111 1994 65 59 62 56.6 62.4 52.4
116 1994 59 55 50 54.4 64.9 54.4
118 1994 61 53 62 44.1 56.0 56.0
121 1994 61 57 50 60.0 68.9 53.5
122 1994 59 57 62 62.2 59.4 48.9
12 1996 61 57 50 57.2 69.1 54.7
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% Black
% Black % Black % White Needed To
District Year Total VAP Voters %Bak %Vft eddT
Pop Participation Participation Equalize
Turnout
23 1996 65 61 57 55.6 66.0 54.3
25 1996 59 55 64 68.5 68.0 49.8
31 1996 68 62 71 56.8 59.4 51.1
41 1996 61 57 52 55.7 70.1 55.7
49 1996 57 54 48 60.5 67.8 52.9
50 1996 60 56 53 57.0 66.2 53.7
51 1996 65 62 61 54.5 64.6 54.2
54 1996 58 54 52 50.4 54.9 52.1
57 1996 58 53 51 49.5 64.0 56.4
59 1996 56 52 55 64.2 64.8 50.2
62 1996 63 60 61 60.9 63.2 50.9
64 1996 56 51 48 61.5 71.0 53.6
66 1996 65 61 62 64.3 71.2 52.5
70 1996 68 65 70 64.0 62.1 49.2
73 1996 71 68 79 69.0 60.0 46.5
74 1996 67 61 62 52.3 59.3 53.1
76 1996 62 57 63 64.0 62.3 49.3
77 1996 60 57 56 64.9 62.9 49.2
82 1996 59 55 52 60.3 71.4 54.2
91 1996 66 62 56 59.2 73.1 55.3
93 1996 53 49 43 62.7 76.8 55.0
95 1996 64 63 57 64.1 73.8 53.5
101 1996 68 64 62 59.5 69.8 54.0
102 1996 57 53 54 65.6 65.3 49.9
103 1996 64 59 58 59.3 67.5 53.2
109 1996 63 59 63 57.0 60.3 51.4
111 1996 65 59 66 64.4 64.7 50.1
116 1996 59 55 53 64.1 69.2 51.9
118 1996 61 53 70 48.2 53.8 52.8
121 1996 61 57 52 65.5 70.0 51.7
122 1996 59 57 56 64.5 67.9 51.3
12 1998 51 48 44 49.9 57.1 53.4
23 1998 65 61 58 43.7 46.0 51.3
25 1998 59 55 66 57.4 50.8 47.0
31 1998 68 62 73 44.7 45.8 50.6
41 1998 61 57 54 49.8 57.6 53.6
49 1998 57 54 50 45.3 47.5 51.2
50 1998 60 56 55 51.0 56.8 52.7
51 1998 65 62 65 49.3 49.3 50.0
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% Black % Black
%Bak% Black % White Needed To
District Year Total VAP Voters %Blc %Wht NeddTPop Participation Participation Equalize
Turnout
54 1998 50 47 46 40.4 42.5 51.3
57 1998 58 53 56 42.3 47.3 52.8
59 1998 56 52 58 54.2 50.0 48.0
62 1998 63 60 63 51.5 52.2 50.4
64 1998 56 51 51 57.1 59.4 51.0
66 1998 65 61 66 58.8 58.1 49.7
70 1998 68 65 72 58.4 49.0 45.6
73 1998 71 68 82 61.0 45.7 42.8
74 1998 67 61 63 43.3 48.5 52.8
76 1998 62 57 66 56.0 53.9 49.0
77 1998 60 57 60 59.0 49.7 45.7
82 1998 54 51 45 48.1 55.5 53.5
91 1998 57 53 48 48.0 60.8 55.9
93 1998 53 49 46 58.3 65.6 52.9
95 1998 64 63 60 54.0 58.3 51.9
101 1998 66 62 63 50.4 54.7 52.0
102 1998 57 53 57 59.8 52.3 46.7
103 1998 57 53 61 54.8 53.4 49.4
109 1998 63 59 65 52.3 49.9 48.9
111 1998 65 59 69 55.5 48.9 46.8
116 1998 59 55 54 59.2 56.7 48.9
118 1998 61 53 73 40.4 41.0 50.4
121 1998 52 50 54 53.1 50.6 48.8
122 1998 54 49 47 54.4 60.1 52.5
Table 8 demonstrates that the black majority was illusory in
many of these districts-blacks comprised over 50% of the total
population, but not over 50% of the voting age population or among
voters on general election day. Not coincidentally, these "illusory"
districts were the districts most likely to be won by whites.77 The
black percent needed to equalize black and white turnout is usually
over 50% as a result of the lower percentage of blacks turning out to
vote on election day.
77. Blacks composed a majority of general election voters in only fourteen of the
twenty-nine elections won by whites. Also, although the average percent black population
of the house districts won by a white candidate was 56%, blacks comprised, on average,
only 52% of the voting age population and 49% of the voters in these districts. See
generally KING, supra note 56 (providing detailed information about his method of
ecological inference).
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Incorporating the level of black cohesion and white crossover
voting required an estimation of the percentage of black and white
voters voting for black candidates. Table 9 provides estimates of
voting patterns by race in South Carolina state house contests in
which at least one black and one white candidate competed for office
between 1992 and 1998.
Table 9: Voting Patterns by Race in Selected South Carolina State House
Elections that Included at Least One Black & One White Candidate,
1992-1998
Prlar.y Rmoff General
Bodyr% Open Or%0Bdc % Black % Whlte % Black % Whli
o D ic- Year Black Incumb Vo For Vots For a Votes For Votes For Ramr Votes For Votes For
VAP Black Black o Black Black of Bladc Black Wonr 
WCeo
Candidate Candidate C-ds Cadidae Caaidat Cond Cadidat e ddat
Winnr
(Cohesion) (CrooT) (Cohesion) (CnomsoT) (Cohesion) (CrcasovT)
House 50 1992 56 W1 65.6 12,9 IWIIB no-imoff unopposed D W
House 93 1992 49 WI 57.2 9.0 1W/IB no runoff unopposed D W
House 95 1992 63 0 notbtccand no runoff 6. 1 5B
House 101 1992 60 0 90.3 12.6 IWIB nonmoff unopposed D B
1oSe 109 1992 1 31 0 92.1517 12B Y Z .9 1 W/9B no black cand R W
_0 199 3 0 2B
House 109 1992 47 BI Oppopsd nonmoff 94.9 1
House 16 1994 29 WI 04.6 29.2 1W/lB no rnoff unoppsed D W
House 41 1994 57 W1 69.1 13.3 W/IB nonmoff noblackcand D W
House 50 2994 56 WI 69.5 12.7 IW/IB nornocff no black cand D W
House 64 1994 51 WI 45.9 7.0 2W/lB norunoff unopposed D W
House 76 1994 57 0 86-8 38 8 WB no noff unopposed D B
oo 91 1994 162 0 974 35.1 IW/2B 90.9 [ IB no black cand D W
House 103 1994 59 WI 72.7 19.0 IW/IB nomoff unopposed D B
Hoose 116 1994 55 BI .. opposed no=off 78.8 I 36.7 D B
House 121 1994 57 0 95A 80.9 IWB norunoff 97.0 1 17.2 D B
House 50 1996 56 WI 453 1 17 2WIB noranoff unopposed D W
Hoose 54 1996 54 WI 38.8 1 lI W/IB nornoff no black cand D W
Hoose 66 1996 61 BI unopposed nonmoff 95.5 243 D B
House 70 1996 65 BI no bit cand norunoff 94.7 32.6 D B
House 76 1996 57 BI unopposed noronoff 97.1 34.5 D B
Hose 77 1996 57 BI unopposed nornoff 97.1 32.2 D B
House 82 1996 55 BI unopposed nonsoff 85.1 39.3 D B
House 91 1996 62 BI unopposed noronoff 92.2 49.4 D B
Ho.e 116 1996 55 BI unoppoed noro-off 92.8 25.6 D B
House 121 1996 57 BI no whste cd nornoff 96.9 28.8 D B
Hoose 12 1998 4 1 WI unopposed no runoff 89.0 26.0 D B
House 50 293142 1 W/lB no runoff no black cand D W
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Primary Runolr General
dlack OOr %Black %White %Black % White %Black %Wlte
Body year BVtesFor VotesFor Race VotesFor VotesFor Race VotesFor VotesFor
YAP Inc"mb Black Black or Black Black of Black Black Party of Ram of
Candidate Candidate Cands Candidate Candidate Conds Candidate Candidate Winner Winner
(Cohuesio) (Creeosr) (Cohesioa) (Crossor) (Cohesion) (CrcX .w)
Hoese 62 1998 60 BI unopposed norunoff 94.2 33.9 D B
Hous 77 1998 57 BI unopposed norunoff 94.3 37.6 D B
House 80 1998 27 0 49.1 163 IW/lB no-off no black cand D W
House 82 1998 51 BI unopposed norusoff 95.5 309 D B
House 109 1998 59 BI unopposed norunoff 99.5 33.6 D B
House 116 1998 55 BI unopposed nooff 91.6 37.6 D B
House 122 1998 49 BI unopposed nouoff 91.0 40.1 D B
Table 9 provides marked evidence of racially polarized voting in
South Carolina state house primary elections. We estimate that, on
average, the black candidates received 68% of the black vote but only
19% of the white vote in Democratic primaries.78 Of course, these
averages mask significant variation between elections. Support for
black candidates was lowest among both black and white voters in
primary contests that included a white incumbent-an estimated 83%
of black voters supported black candidates in open seat races, while
only 60% of blacks cast ballots for black challengers running against
white incumbents. Only 12% of whites supported black challengers
running against white incumbents79 -and an estimated 32% of white
voters voted for black candidates for open seats.
The nineteen general elections in which a black Democrat
competed against a white Republican provide further evidence of
racial polarization. Our estimates indicate that the average black
candidate received 93% of the black vote but only 31% of the white
vote. Again, incumbency greatly influenced support for black
candidates: the sixteen incumbent black candidates received an
average of 34% of white votes, but the three non-incumbent black
candidates won an average of only 16% of the white vote. On the
other hand, black support for black Democrats did not vary by
incumbency.
Table 10 incorporates the level of black cohesion and white
crossover voting into the functional analysis. Based on the levels of
78. Support for candidates by race was calculated utilizing Gary King's ecological
inference program. See generally KING, supra note 56 (discussing uses of ecological
inference methods).
79. Not surprisingly, only one of the twelve black challengers actually won the
Democratic primary.
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black and white participation, including roll-off, and the amount of
black and white support for black candidates, we estimated the
percent black required for a district to nominate a black in the
Democratic primary or elect a black Democrat to the state legislature.
The average state legislative district in South Carolina needs to be
around 56% black in order to provide black-preferred candidates
with an equal opportunity for victory in the Democratic primary.
However, the percent black required for a black Democrat to have an
even shot of winning the nomination is closely related to incumbency.
The average percent black required was 64% black for the twelve
districts held by incumbents, but only 44% black for the six open
seats.
Table 10: Percent Black Needed for Black Candidate to Win, Incorporating
Cohesion & Crossover: Selected South Carolina State House Contests,
1992-1998
F--te slmated Estimted Percent Estimted Peret
Pernt Percent Voted For State Votlng ForBLack % Black
Voed et Voted For State Legidature of Cadidate ot Needed
Year Body District Black Open or eGivn Both
VAP - -.-- Cobesion &
I I ..Cro sor
Blck White Black White Black hite Black White
AP Voters V VAP VAP Votes Voters
PRIMARY ELECTIONS
1992 Hotos 50 56 WI 33.8 30.2 57.5 59.0 19.4 17.8 65.6 12.9 59.6
1992 Hots 93 49 WI 37.1 29.0 44.5 53.9 16.5 15.6 57.2 9.0 66.3
1992 Hoes 101 60 0 45.1 36.1 61.4 71.7 27.7 25.9 90.3 126 47.3
1992 Hcuss 108 31 0 33.1 25.7 59.2 41.4 19.6 10.6 92.2 18.7 33.7
1994 Hoose 16 29 WI 159 13.7 78.0 81.2 12.4 11.1 84.6 29.2 41.6
1994 House 41 57 WI 165 19.5 93.8 90.4 15.3 17.7 69.1 13.3 60.8
1994 Hoos 50 56 WI 24.1 27.4 92.8 90.4 22.4 24.8 69.5 12.7 60.3
1994 Hoose 64 51 WI 26.3 33.4 85.1 92.6 22.4 31.0 45.9 7.0 766
1994 Hoe 76 57 0 8.4 43.4 78.1 646 6.6 28.0 86.8 38.8 52.0
1994 Howoe 91 62 0 23.2 24.6 76.1 79.5 17.6 19.6 87.4 35.1 40.1
1994 Hoose 103 59 WI 23.0 26.6 82.4 95.0 19.0 25.3 72.7 19.0 58.0
1994 Noose 121 57 0 9.6 26.6 62.7 81.0 6.0 21.6 95.4 80.9 15.9
1996 Noose 50 56 WI 24.0 20.6 95.4 93.7 22.9 19.3 453 11.7 70.1
1996 Noose 54 54 WI 33.0 29.1 94.3 94.1 31.1 27.4 38.8 1.1 78.9
1998 Nosse 50 36 WI 22.1 23.0 80.8 93.2 17.9 21.4 35.2 14.2 76.3
198 Noose 80 27 0 2.1 7.5 90.6 87.6 1.9 6.5 49.1 163 76.4
GEIRAL EIECflONS
1992 Noose 95 63 0 43.5 63.8 92.2 93.7 40.1 59.8 96.0 5.9 57.9
1992 Noose 109 47 BI 393 408 85.7 88.1 33.7 36.0 94.9 26.6 40.4
1994 H-e 116 55 BI 33.1 41.6 81.7 78.7 27.1 32.7 78.8 36.7 44.2
1994 Hoos. 121 57 0 35.6 47.5 91,2 92.1 32.5 43.8 97.0 17.2 48.8
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KFiMatrdEstimated Peat Estimatd Peret Estimated Peraenlt, rctta Voted For Stat Voting For B Blck
Po Voted For State ture of Canddalte of
Y- B dld B- Open or Voe f Legiature o Neede
Year Body District Black Inc9Ob GIvenBoth
VAP s -Cohesion &
Bladk While Blark WhIle Black White Blade Whle
VAP VAP VAP Voters Voters
GENERAL ELECIONS
1996 Hooe 66 61 BI 55A 51.6 90.6 88.5 50.2 45.6 95.5 24.3 384
1996 House 70 65 BI 47.0 37.6 94.6 84.6 44.5 31.8 94.7 32.6 31.2
1996 Hoose 76 57 BI 43.8 33,3 6.9 8.7 38.1 29.6 97.1 34.5 303
1996 House 77 57 B 460 47.4 882 87.2 40.6 41.3 97.1 32-2 35.6
1996 House 82 55 B 44.0 49.0 86.1 88.1 37.9 43.2 85.1 39.3 39.3
1996 Hoose 91 62 BI 41.8 52.3 88.2 87.7 36.9 45.9 92.2 49.4 31.5
1996 House 116 55 BI 46.4 512 89.5 89.3 41.5 45.2 92.8 25.6 42.2
1996 Hoese 121 57 BI 454 55.1 89.7 87-5 40.7 48.2 9&9 28.8 400
1998 Hoo 12 48 WI 35.8 41.5 62.4 88.9 29.5 36.9 89.0 26.0 46.0
1998 Hoo 62 60 BI 38.1 33.4 84.1 77.1 32.1 25.7 942 33.9 32.6
1998 House 77 57 BI 46.2 41.3 80.9 88.9 37A 36.7 94,3 37.6 33.8
1998 Houo 82 51 BI .38.5 48.9 88.7 93.8 34.1 45.8 95.5 30.9 41.5
1999 Hous 109 59 EI 39.7 39.0 66.7 95.9 33.6 25.8 99.5 336 29.1
1998 Hooe 116 53 B1 446 467 92.9 646 41.6 39.5 91.6 37.6 34.7
1998 Noose 122 49 El 47.7 32.4 643 956 31.7 45.0 91.0 40.1 39.3
Despite the lower threshold for open seats, a majority black
district was still required in a number of instances in order to provide
black voters with an opportunity to nominate a black Democratic
candidate.
Table 10 indicates that districts needed to be an average of only
39% black in voting age population for African-American candidates
to have a 50% probability of winning the general election. The
percent black required is much higher for seats not already held by
black incumbents. The sixteen black incumbents required districts
only 37% black, on average, to have an equal opportunity of victory
in the general election. The three non-incumbents, however, needed
51% black districts, on average, to have the same opportunity.
We need to be very careful to evaluate the results of our
functional analysis not only in terms of context, but also in terms of
common sense. For example, an examination of the results of our
analysis for South Carolina House District 121 in 1994 (the only
district election for which we have both primary and general election
results) yields the misguided conclusion that had the district been
only 15.9% black, an African American might still have won the
Democratic primary (although not the general election). In fact, this
[Vol. 791422
EFFECTIVE MINORITY DISTRICTS
estimate was a product of a 57% black district with very few non-
Republican whites, making it unlikely that viable white Democratic
candidates would contest the primary even for an open seat.
Obviously, if this district was in actuality only 15.9% black, voters
would have a very different set of expectations, and a very different
set of candidates would be competing for office. Both the racial and
party balance of a district must be considered when conducting a
functional analysis-changing this balance affects both the
expectations of the voters and the character of the candidates that
choose to run for legislative office.
The data from state legislative districts in South Carolina indicate
the percent black needed to provide blacks with an equal opportunity
to elect their candidates of choice varies substantially from district to
district. African Americans may now win office in some 45% black
districts (although this is usually true only when black incumbents are
running for office), but blacks may fail to win election in many areas
unless a majority black district is created. Indeed, 65% black districts
are likely still required in some areas to assure the election of
candidates of choice of the black community. In addition, if there is a
white incumbent seeking re-election in the district, 65% black may
not suffice.
CONCLUSION
As our analysis of recent congressional elections in the South-
and state legislative contests in South Carolina-clearly
demonstrates, no simple cutoff point of 50% minority-or any other
percent minority-guarantees minority voters an equal opportunity to
elect candidates of choice. A case-specific functional analysis, which
takes into account such factors as the relative participation rates of
whites and minorities, and the degree of cohesion and crossover
voting that can be expected, as well as the type of election (i.e.,
congressional, state legislative, etc.) and the multi-stage election
process, must be conducted to determine the percentage minority
necessary to create an effective minority district.
Factors other than those incorporated in our conceptual
framework must also be considered because they can also affect the
opportunity to elect black candidates to office-the presence of white
incumbents is especially significant in this regard. Other factors to
consider include the presence of black incumbents-we must be
particularly careful in projecting white crossover rates and black
cohesion rates from contests in which there is a black incumbent onto
open seat contests in the same district-and the racial and partisan
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balance of the district.
We end on a further cautionary note: our conceptual framework
produces only a de minimis estimate-one that offers black voters
only a 50% probability of electing black candidates to office. It by no
means guarantees black electoral success. Clearly the percentage
black would need to be higher than our conceptual framework
predicts if we wish to offer black voters more than a coin flip's chance
of electing their preferred candidates. The overall impact of the plan,
including not only how many representatives preferred by minority
voters are likely to be elected but also with what degree of certainty,
must be examined in order to determine if the plan satisfies the
Voting Rights Act. If a legislature in a 10% black state drew one
hundred districts, ten of which barely met this de minimis percentage,
and the remainder of which gave African Americans essentially no
chance of electing their chosen candidate, the result would be ninety
districts in which minority candidates had virtually no chance of
getting elected and ten districts in which minority candidates had no
better than a fifty-fifty chance of getting elected-and in a bad year,
an all-white legislature might be elected. Such a plan is unlikely to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act, as properly interpreted. Ultimately, a
case-specific analysis that considers not only each district individually,
but the plan's overall impact is essential to give minority voters an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
their candidates of choice.
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APPENDIX
THE IMPACT OF PARTY REGISTRATION CHOICES OF WHITES ON
BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS
The two-stage election process model provides a method of
incorporating the primary (and runoff) election along with the
general election when determining the percent minority population
necessary to provide minorities with an equal opportunity to elect
minority-preferred candidates to office.
In this model, the overall probability of black electoral success is
the product of two probabilities: the probability that a black
candidate can be nominated in the Democratic primary, and the
probability that the black candidate can then win the general election.
By partitioning voters into three classes-black Democrats, white
Democrats, and white Republicans 8Q-we show how the combination
of primary and general election effects can, in principle, give rise to a
non-linear relationship between the degree of Republicanization of
white voters and the likelihood that an African-American candidate
will win both the primary and the general election.
Let:
B = the black population proportion.
W = 1 - B = the proportion of whites (i.e., non-blacks).
D = the proportion of registered Democrats (necessarily greater
than or equal to B).
R = 1 - D = the proportion of registered Republicans.
d = D - B = the proportion of white Democrats.
c = the proportion of white Democratic voters who vote
Democratic in the general election when the Democratic
nominee is African-American.
Assume, for simplicity, that, in general elections, all blacks are
registered and vote Democratic, and all white Republicans vote for
the Republican candidate. Similarly, let us posit that white and black
registration and turnout levels are (nearly) the same so that we can
use voting age population proportion as a direct proxy for
80. This model effectively treats blacks who vote for Republicans as indistinguishable
from white Republicans because neither group votes in Democratic primaries and both
groups prefer Republican candidates in the general elections.
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composition of the voting electorate. None of these assumptions are
critical in what follows, but they allow us to simplify the exposition so
as to make the argument clear.
Under the above assumptions, in a general election, the vote
share of a black candidate who wins the primary equals:
B + c(D- B).
For this value to exceed the share of the Republican opponent
we must have:
(1 -c)B + cD > R + (1 -c)(D- B). (1)
If c is low, this can occur if B is large enough; if c is high, this
inequality can be satisfied if D is large. Equation (1) can also be
satisfied if both cD and B are "moderately" high (e.g., B = 0.25,
D = 0.6 and c > 0.42).
Now, let us consider what it takes for a black candidate to win
the Democratic primary with certainty. In the primary, to find the
worst case scenario, we will assume voting is perfectly polarized along
racial lines; and to simplify the model, we will also assume a head-to-
head contest between a single white and a single black candidate. For
the black candidate to win the primary, we must have B > (D - B), i.e.,
2B>D (2)
We can re-express these results in terms of white Democrats, d.
For the black candidate to win the primary, we must have:
B>d (2)'
In like manner, we may rewrite equation (1) as:
B + cd > R + (1 - c)D (1)'
For a minority candidate to win both the primary and general
elections, we must satisfy both equations (1)' and (2)'. Of course, if R
is greater than 0.5, then no matter how large the white Democratic
"loyalty" rate may happen to be, the Republican candidate will still
win the general election.
We can make these ideas clearer by portraying them in graphic
terms. In the figures that follow (figures 1-4), the right triangle
represents all possible district compositions. Along the hypotenuse of
the triangle, there are no white Democrats; black Democrats plus
Republicans comprise 100% of the electorate. At the origin (0,0),
there are no black Democrats and no Republicans; white Democrats
comprise 100% of the electorate.
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Figure 1: Primary Lines Given Select
Levels of Black and White Voter
Turnout and Cohesion
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Proportion Republicans
Figure 1 graphs several different primary election scenarios.
Line A represents the primary line for B > d. Lines B and C illustrate
two alternative assumptions. If, in a Democratic primary election,
black Democrats are less likely to turn out or are less cohesive than
white Democrats, then more black Democrats will be needed to
assure control of the primary and therefore the slope of the line must
increase; line B represents that scenario. Conversely, if, in the
Democratic primary, black Democrats are more likely to turn out or
more cohesive than white Democrats, then fewer black Democrats
will be needed to assure control of the primary and therefore the
slope of the line will decrease; line C represents that scenario.
Figure 2 demonstrates several different general election
scenarios, each one representing a different level of white Democratic
"loyalty"-that is, a different value for c. Line D is based on the
assumption that all white Democrats are "disloyal" to their party
when faced with a black-preferred Democratic nominee (c = 0.0). If
that assumption were true, black Democrats would need to comprise
at least 50% of the electorate to ensure that their preferred
candidates would win the general election. Line D therefore is a
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Figure 2: General Election Lines Given
Select Levels of White Democratic
"Loyalty"
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horizontal line segment running from (0.0,0.5) to (0.5,0.5); only
districts falling above that line are winnable for a candidate preferred
by black Democrats.
Line E is based on the opposite assumption: that all white
Democrats are "loyal" to their party (c = 1.00) and will vote for a
black-preferred Democratic nominee even if they opposed that
candidate in the primary. If that assumption were true, black-
preferred Democratic candidates would prevail in the general
election so long as Democrats comprised at least half of the
electorate. Therefore, line E is a vertical line segment running from
(0.5,0.0) to (0.5,0.5); any district to the left of line E is winnable for a
black-preferred Democratic nominee.
Reality, of course, usually lies between these two extremes; thus
0 < c < 1.0. For illustrative purposes, figure 2 shows lines F, G, and H,
representing c = 0.33, c = 0.50, and c = 0.80, respectively. As white
Democratic "loyalty" increases, black-preferred candidates can win
general elections in more districts, so the General Election Line
swings downward.
In the final two figures, figures 3 and 4, the Primary Lines and
the General Lines have been combined. For simplicity's sake, the
assumption that B > D defines the Primary Line is made in both
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figures, but two different white Democratic "loyalty" rates are
depicted: figure 3 uses c = 0.50, and figure 4 uses c = 0.80.
Figure 3: Combination of Primary Line
A and General Line G Assuming
Moderate White Democratic "Loyalty"
(C=o.50)
0E 0.8
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.o 0.4 
-
0
o0.21
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Proportion Republicans
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Figure 4: Combination of Primary Line
A and General Line H Assuming
Moderate White Democratic "Loyalty"
(C=0.80)
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In both figures, the shaded area represents those districts in
which the black-preferred candidate is likely to succeed at both stages
of the two-stage election process. The shaded portion is larger in
figure 4 than in figure 3 because black-preferred candidates can win
more districts if white Democrats are more loyal. Figure 3
demonstrates that, if half the white Democrats are "loyal," a district
that is at least one-third black Democratic will elect a black-preferred
candidate so long as the white Democrats and the Republicans are
evenly balanced. In figure 4, with a higher level of white Democratic
"loyalty," black-preferred candidates can prevail in an even larger set
of districts, including some that are less than 28% black Democratic-
so long as the proper balance is struck between white Democrats
(also less than 28% of the total electorate) and Republicans (44.4%
of the total electorate).
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